Short-term determinants of the idiosyncratic sovereign risk premium: a regime-dependent analysis for European credit default swaps by Giovanni Calice (1253097) et al.
1 
 
Short-term Determinants of Idiosyncratic Sovereign Risk Premium: 
A Regime-Dependent Analysis for European Credit Default Swaps 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the dynamics of the sovereign CDS term premium, i.e. difference between 
10Y and 5Y CDS spreads. It can be regarded a forward-looking measure of idiosyncratic sovereign 
default risk as perceived by financial markets. For some European countries this premium featured 
distinct non stationary and heteroskedastic pattern during the last years. Using a Markov switching 
unobserved component model, we decompose the daily CDS term premium of five European 
countries into two unobserved components of statistically different nature and link them in a vector 
autoregression to various daily observed financial market variables. We find that such decomposition 
is vital for understanding the short-term dynamics of this premium. The strongest impacts can be 
attributed to CDS market liquidity, local stock returns, and overall risk aversion. By contrast, the 
impact of shocks from the sovereign bond market is rather muted. Therefore, the CDS market 
microstructure effect and investor sentiment play the main roles in sovereign risk evaluation in real 
time. Moreover, we also find that the CDS term premium response to shocks is regime-dependent and 
can be ten times stronger during periods of high volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
Tensions in the euro area sovereign debt market represent the most recent form of the global financial 
crisis. The succession of events following the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis has 
clearly underscored that excessive systemic sovereign credit risk can lead to detrimental real 
macroeconomic effects and financial instability. Indeed, it is because of the risk of macroeconomic 
shocks and financial contagion that regulators and governments are currently so concerned about 
sovereign-specific credit risk. However, there is little theoretical and empirical basis on how to 
interpret the short-term dynamics of sovereign risk premia (i.e., compensation for sovereign risk as 
perceived in real time by financial markets), which have changed very abruptly in recent years. 
The use of sovereign CDS has increased dramatically during the last decade. They represent key 
instruments for credit risk transfer related to sovereign exposures. However, since the onset of the 
U.S. subprime crisis they have become very controversial and many commentators have blamed them 
for exacerbating the credit crunch by allowing excessive leverage and risk-taking by financial 
institutions and even market manipulation (see Calice et al., 2013, for a discussion). CDS spreads are 
deemed to be a more direct measure of credit risk than sovereign bond yields, since they are not 
distorted by other risks unrelated to defaults and market microstructure (Longstaff et al., 2005). In 
particular, as CDS contracts do not require up-front funding, CDS spreads are less distorted by 
liquidity dry-up during crisis periods (Chen et al., 2007). 
Despite a sizeable literature on credit risk, empirical studies on CDS that involve modeling of the 
entire credit curve are still rare. A major reason for this is that data on sovereign CDS premia for a 
wider range of maturities have only recently become available. Indeed, although CDS contracts on 
some sovereign issuers are extensively traded, the market is still rather illiquid. Consequently, there is 
a paucity of empirical work regarding their CDS term structure, with studies focused mainly on U.S. 
synthetic corporate indices such as the CDX (see Longstaff et al., 2008; Calice et al., 2012). Pan and 
Singleton (2008) explores the nature of default arrival and recovery implicit in the term structure of 
the sovereign spreads of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. 
Specifically, we posit that the CDS term premium embeds the economy-wide forward-looking default 
risks. We measure this term premium as the difference between sovereign CDS spreads at 10-year 
and 5-year maturities. These two maturities are the most liquid segments of the sovereign CDS 
market. Therefore, to our knowledge this is the first study to explicitly analyze the sovereign CDS 
term premium (Calice et al., 2012, examine the U.S. corporate CDX term premium). In general, the 
evolution of the CDS term premium across time resembles the behavior of the yield curve and 
follows a mean-reverting process, despite short-term spikes during periods of financial turmoil. These 
spikes can be seen as regime changes (normal times vs. turmoil). Consequently, we assume that the 
term premium can be decomposed by means of the unobserved component model into two 
components. The first is a stationary component, which corresponds to the theoretical behavior of the 
CDS term premium and as such should be driven by fundamental forces (see also Garratt et al., 
2006). The second component, which is modeled as a driftless random walk process, represents a 
seemingly unpredictable component in the term premium. Essentially, this component captures 
market uncertainty, which induces random walk behavior in the overall CDS term premium. The 
apparent heteroskedasticity will also be accounted for. We do this by means of a Markov-switching 
model that allows for two different volatility regimes for each CDS term premium subcomponent. 
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Our study focuses on five European sovereigns whose CDS term premia experienced notable swings 
during the global financial crisis period, which in turn resulted in nonstationary patterns and abrupt 
changes in their volatilities. This applies both to countries of the EMU periphery (we consider Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal) and to Central European countries (we consider the Czech Republic and 
Poland).1 Our central argument here is that the evolving pattern of the sovereign CDS term premium 
can provide the relevant authorities with more detailed information on financial market perceptions of 
the vulnerabilities in sovereign debt markets as well as on the sources of propagation of those 
vulnerabilities. A better and deeper understanding of these forces will in turn serve as a useful tool for 
the identification of systemic and contagion risks and will also potentially enable authorities to 
respond effectively in advance in order to mitigate shocks jeopardizing financial stability. 
A number of important empirical results emerge from this analysis. First, we show that the 
decomposition of the CDS premium of a sovereign entity is relevant and major changes in the CDS 
term premium are driven by spikes in the nonstationary component. Second, decomposing the CDS 
term premium proves useful in understanding its short-term dynamics. Most selected financial market 
variables, observed at high frequency, significantly affect the dynamics of the nonstationary 
component, which is a seemingly unpredictable random walk. Third, the CDS term premium shows 
very pronounced regime-dependent behavior. In particular, the response of the CDS term premium to 
normalized shocks to some financial variables can be ten times stronger during periods of high 
volatility. All in all, our results show that CDS market microstructure effects (i.e., liquidity) and 
investor sentiment (as measured by stock market returns and the VIX) seem to play the main role in 
sovereign risk evaluation. The regime-dependent behavior suggests the existence of market 
overshooting during turmoil periods. These findings cast some doubt on whether short-term 
movements of the CDS credit curve should be interpreted in terms of changes in sovereign default 
risk rather than as a (sometimes exaggerated) response to other factors arguably disconnected from 
the actual risk of the sovereign concerned. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical 
considerations on the economic determinants of the sovereign CDS term premium and describes the 
data used in the analysis. Section 3 presents our methodology. Section 4 reports the results from the 
empirical analysis. Section 5 summarizes the results and makes concluding remarks. 
2. CDS Term Premium 
The CDS term premium is measured as the difference between spreads at 10-year and 5-year 
maturities and can be viewed as representing the default risk uncertainty over a 5-year time horizon. 
Therefore, the CDS term premium of a sovereign can be interpreted as a forward-looking measure of 
sovereign default risk as perceived by financial markets in real time. It also seems that this term 
premium tracks more closely the idiosyncratic part of sovereign credit risk, as it is arguably less 
prone to contagion than sovereign CDS/bonds of certain maturity. If the forces of international 
                                                          
1
 Data availability and reliability constrain our sample to these five countries, whereas countries such as Ireland and 
Hungary could be included as well, unlike Greece, whose sovereign CDS quotes were distorted and bear little 
economic significant in the face of the expected imminent credit event that was finally declared in March 2012.  
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contagion are in place there is in principle no reason to believe that they might have a differential 
impact on 5-year and 10-year maturities and affect the term premium.2 
2.1 Economics of the CDS Term Premium 
To motivate our empirical strategy and to guide our empirical tests, we begin with a brief discussion 
of the theoretical properties of the CDS term premium.3 We extend the canonical formulation of 
deriving forward rates from the term structure of default-free interest rates (e.g., Harrison and Kreps, 
1979) to a country’s CDS term premium. Hence, the analysis that follows is in the spirit of deriving 
forward rates from the term structure of default-free interest rates.4 
Consider a unit of time t that denotes quarters. Suppose that , 1t tm   
denotes a stochastic discount factor 
and , 1t t   
is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if a country is solvent over the interval 
 , 1t t   and the value 0 otherwise. This can in practice (e.g., by rating agencies) be approximated by 
the marginal default probability (MDP) and the cumulative probability of default (CPD). Then, the 
premium paid on 10Y sovereign CDS solves (in a risk-free world with complete and arbitrage-free 
markets): 
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where sL is the loss in the event of default between s-1 and s. The right-hand side of the equation can 
be rewritten as the sum of two terms, A and B, where 
 
20
, , , 1 1
0
1t t t s t t s t s t s t s
s
A E m L       

         (2) 
 
40
, , , 1 1
20
1t t t s t t s t s t s t s
s
B E m L       

         (3) 
The previous two equations can be rewritten as follows: 
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where A is the solution for 5Y CDS bought at time t=0 and 
5
20tCDS   
in the term B is the forward 
CDS spread of 5Y CDS at time t=20 (i.e., after 5 years, that is, when a 5Y CDS contract priced in A 
matures). Combining (1) and (3) we obtain 
                                                          
2
 This is evident from simple correlation measures, which are substantially higher for pairs of sovereign CDS at 
certain maturity (5 or 10 years) than between the corresponding CDS term premia. Similarly, it is relatively 
straightforward to extract a single informative factor from a sample of CDS quotes than from a sample of CDS term 
spreads. Therefore, looking at the spread at a particular maturity implies the basic identification strategy of isolating 
idiosyncratic from common factors. This challenge has recently been tackled by several papers aimed at examining 
contagion, especially in the European context. By contrast, analysis of the slope of the sovereign CDS credit curve 
has been largely ignored in the literature. 
3
 This is not intended as an exhaustive summary, but is simply meant to illustrate the economic foundations of the 
CDS term premium and give a specific example of the mechanisms our model predicts. 
4
 We are very grateful to Iulian Obreja for his suggestion on this framework. 
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A strong link can be seen between the sign of the CDS term premium 
10 5
t tCDS CDS  
and the sign of 
5 10
20t tCDS CDS  , which is the difference between the forward 5-year CDS premium and the current 
10-year CDS premium. Therefore, the CDS term premium is negative when a decrease is expected in 
the demand for default protection in the future. For example, if a country is currently facing a 
financial crisis but it is expected to be out of the crisis within 5 years the probability of imminent 
default (in 5 years from now) is higher than a default at a longer time horizon (after 5 years). 
Therefore, the sign of the CDS term premium is strongly related to investors’ predictions about the 
timing of a country entering a crisis, which in turn determines the probability of default. Of course, 
this is in general dependent on the state (and evolution) of the fundamentals of the country. However, 
CDS spreads and the CDS term premium (the cost of external funding) are both subject to substantial 
short-term variation. Therefore, our objective is to explore empirically the factors driving these short-
term dynamics of the sovereign CDS market, specifically, the market perception that a country might 
enter a crisis as tracked by the CDS term premium. Evidently, such short-term dynamics cannot 
reasonably be linked to changes in fundamentals, which evolve rather slowly. Therefore, we focus on 
financial market variables that feature similar short-term dynamics as the CDS term premium. 
2.2 Data 
Our study focuses on selected European countries whose CDS term premia experienced the most 
notable swings between positive and negative territory, which in turn resulted in nonstationary 
patterns and abrupt changes in volatility. As a rule-of-thumb we focus on those countries for which 
the CDS term premium amounted to at least 30–40 basis points (positive or negative) for a period in 
excess of a single trading day.5 This applies to two groups of EU sovereigns: (i) the EMU periphery 
(Spain, Portugal, and Ireland; Italy is excluded from the analysis due to data constraints), and (ii) the 
CEE countries (the Czech Republic and Poland; Hungary is also excluded due to data constraints). 
Our data sample spans from September 2007 (for some countries slightly later) to February 2012. 
Since our main empirical focus is on the short-term dynamics of the CDS term premium, we use daily 
market data.6 The main source of data is Bloomberg LP. 
In Figure 1 we plot the 10Y and 5Y sovereign CDS spreads (upper panel) and the respective CDS 
term premium and CDS market liquidity (lower panel). Interestingly, we can see that whereas 
positive values of the CDS term premium correspond to an upward-sloping sovereign yield curve 
driven by a liquidity premium, sovereign financial distress results typically in a negative term 
premium (i.e., similar to the inversion of the yield curve).7 In terms of statistical properties, it is 
                                                          
5
 On the contrary, we disregard smaller deviations, which in our view can be attributed primarily to market 
microstructure factors.  
6
 With daily data we can explore the richness in the variation of the observations. Monthly frequency time series 
would exhibit less volatile dynamic behavior since the short-term fluctuations would simply average out. 
7
 The EMU periphery exhibits positive values over the 2007–2008 period, then fluctuates considerably in 2009 and 
2010, and then turns negative. Finally, the term premium for the CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland) clearly reveals the changing perception of the “safety” of that region. The premium is initially positive, then 
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apparent that the CDS term premium (lower panel) should be mean-reverting, as it is the difference 
between two series (10Y and 5Y CDS spreads) that are either both stationary or both nonstationary 
but cointegrated. However, as can be seen in the lower panel, the CDS term premium often evolves as 
a nonstationary process. This seems to be related not only to long memory, but also to structural 
changes in the process that we need to account for.8 
As we are interested in the sources of the short-term dynamics, we collect several financial market 
variables which are observable at daily frequency. It is worth pointing out that while variables (i)–(v) 
denote a set of key domestic variables tracking developments in the sovereign CDS market itself 
(liquidity) as well as other markets (sovereign bond market, money market, banking CDS market, 
stock market), variables (vi) and (vii) identify two potentially relevant international variables: 
(i) Sovereign CDS market liquidity calculated as the average of the bid-ask spread of 10Y and 5Y 
CDS. 
(ii) The slope of the bond yield curve of each sovereign, which is calculated as the difference between 
the 10Y and the 5Y government bond yield (bid-close). This slope is the bond market counterpart of 
the CDS term premium.  
(iii) The short-term interest rate is proxied by the 3M money market interest rate for each country 
(3M Euribor for the euro area countries). It tracks monetary policy as well as liquidity conditions in 
the money market. 
(iv) The stock index return, calculated as the daily return (in percentage points) of the local major 
stock market index. 
(v) The CDS term premium of the banking sector, which is computed as the difference between the 
10Y and the 5Y CDS quotes (mid-price) of the two largest banks by assets in each country. This 
variable encompasses the potential transfer of credit risk between sovereign debt and the domestic 
banking sector. 
(vi) International sovereign spillover/contagion, which is proxied by a common factor derived from 
the CDS term premia of other EU countries (i.e., for each of the five countries considered here a 
factor is derived by applying the principal factor method to the CDS term premia of the remaining 
available EU countries except the one analyzed). Following Longstaff et al. (2011), we use only the 
first factor, which accurately captures most of the variance. 
(vii) Stock market volatility, as measured by the Chicago Board of Options Exchange S&P500 
Volatility Index (VIX). This variable reflects the overall market sentiment or the degree of risk 
aversion, which can have disturbing effects on sovereign risk premia.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
moves into negative territory for several months towards the end of 2008, and has been positive since then (turning 
negative in late 2011 for Hungary). 
8
 An alternative approach to dealing with long-memory and structural breaks with high-frequency financial series, 
specifically the euro OIS spread, is provided by Cassola and Morana (2012). 
7 
 
Figure 1: Sovereign 5Y and 10Y CDS Spreads (Upper Panel) and Sovereign Term Premium/Spread and CDS Market Liquidity (Lower Panel) 
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Note: 10Y CDS is the sovereign 10Y CDS spread (mid-price), 5Y CDS is the sovereign 5Y CDS spread (mid-price), CDS term premium is the difference between 10Y 
CDS and 5Y CDS, and CDS liquidity is the average of the bid-ask spread of 10Y and 5Y CDS. 
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3. Methodology 
We investigate the dynamic behavior of the sovereign CDS term premia of a selected group of 
European countries. Whereas economic logic suggests that these univariate series should be 
mean-reverting, for these sovereigns they have been characterized by pronounced nonstationary 
features during the recent eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Hence, to better understand the 
dynamics of the CDS term premium, it is crucial to address the nonstationarity methodologically. 
For this purpose, we decompose such series into a stationary component and a nonstationary 
component and study them separately. This provides a fairly robust statistical framework akin to 
the cycle-trend decomposition commonly used in business cycle analysis. Furthermore, our 
approach is strongly inspired by recent developments in inflation modeling. Whereas inflation 
(like the CDS term premium) is generally regarded from the theoretical viewpoint as being a 
mean-reverting process, empirical applications have started to explicitly account for its 
nonstationarity. Indeed, authors such as Stock and Watson (2007) have stressed the importance of 
distinguishing between stationary and nonstationary components and their different drivers. 
Whereas the nonstationary component of inflation is now believed to be driven by structural 
factors that are subject to regime changes (e.g., the monetary policy framework and the credibility 
of the inflation target), its stationary part can reasonably be linked to cyclical fluctuations of the 
economy in the original logic of the Phillips curve. 
Several approaches to decomposing univariate time series have been proposed in the econometric 
literature. A well-established methodology is the unobserved components approach, postulated in 
separate contributions by Harvey (1985), Watson (1986), and Clark (1987). The econometric 
methodology employed in this paper relies upon the statistical approach developed initially by 
Nerlove, Grether, and Carvalho (1979) and extended by Harvey (1989) and Harvey and Shephard 
(1993). The essential element of this methodology is to estimate a model which considers the 
observed time series as being the sum of a permanent (nonstationary) and a transitory (stationary) 
component. These components capture salient features of the series that may be unobserved and 
are useful in explaining and predicting its time evolution. In terms of our decomposition of the 
CDS term premium, the stationary (mean-reverting) component underscores the fundamental 
driving forces in the economy, while the nonstationary (random walk) component captures the 
overall uncertainty underpinning the evolution of the fundamentals, which can be driven by 
financial shocks.9 
As evidenced by the sharp increase in sovereign risk premia and their volatilities during the recent 
financial crisis, sovereign risk premia behave differently in distinct regimes. We assume that those 
changes are recurrent. By allowing for endogenous regime switches in volatility, one does not 
have to explicitly set a switching threshold value, but the data endogenously identify the 
switching to a different regime. Markov-switching (as opposed to models assuming smooth 
                                                          
9
 Use of the terms “permanent” and “transitory” would be slightly confusing in our case. Whereas in business 
cycle analysis, the GDP series have a permanent (nonstationary) trend and there is some temporary (stationary) 
cyclical fluctuation around the trend, in our case the CDS term premium should be a mean-reverting variable. 
Therefore, the fundamental part is mean-reverting and stationary as well, while the short-term spikes are 
nonstationary. Therefore, the economic meaning of the two components is different.  
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transition10) is motivated by the abrupt regime changes attributable to the high-frequency nature 
of the data. By adding Markov-switching disturbance terms into the two unobserved components, 
one can explicitly model high- and low-volatility regimes over different time periods. Although it 
complicates the estimation procedures – since additional filters must be employed to make 
inference on the hidden Markov chain process – allowing the two components to depend on 
different states of the economy provides an alternative approach to dealing with the potential 
heteroskedastic variance in the daily risk premia series.11 We assume that allowing for switches in 
disturbances represents a reasonable grade of approximation as opposed to allowing for switches 
in both coefficient and disturbances. The latter would potentially lead to a higher number of 
regimes, which would not be feasible for further empirical analysis. 
3.1 Modeling the Unobserved Factors that Drive the Term Premia 
Let 
1,tX  represent the stationary component (STAT) that drives the term premium, and assume 
that 
1,tX  is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process whose dynamic evolution can be described by the 
stochastic differential equation 
  1, 1, 1 1,1 k t k tt t tX e e X Z          (7) 
where 1
250
t   is the sampling interval and 
 
1 1
1
2
k te
k
 
 
 . It is easy to see that 0k   
implies 1k te    and hence stationarity, 0k   or 0t   implies 1k te   , and the model 
converges to a unit root model. 
Now, let 
2,tX  be the second component that drives the term premium. We assume that it follows a 
driftless random walk (RW) process as shown in Eq. (8): 
 2, 2 2,t tdX dZ  (8) 
where 2  is the scaled volatility parameter and 2,tdZ  is the standard Brownian motion, which can 
be assumed to be either dependent on or independent of 
1,tdZ .The discrete time version of Eq. (8) 
yields 
 2, 2, 1 2 2,t t tX X Z    (9) 
Although an RW process, such as the one described in (9), has infinite unconditional mean and 
variance, the conditional mean and variance can be measured as 
                                                          
10
 Prominent examples of such models are time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) and the 
smooth transition autoregressive model (STAR). 
11
 The more conventional way of testing for financial time series heteroskedasticity is to consider ARCH-type 
volatility models, which allow constant unconditional volatility but time-varying conditional volatility. However, 
neglecting possible regime shifts in the unconditional variance, as shown in Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), 
would overestimate the persistence of the variance of a time series. 
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 
 
2, 2, 1
2
2, 2
t t t
t t
E X X
Var X 


 (10) 
where the conditional expectation of the process at the current time t  depends only on the 
observation in the previous time period. 
Given the two unobserved components constructed using Eq. (8) through Eq. (10), we estimate 
the parameter space as given by this system, with the dynamics of the two components updating 
in a Bayesian manner, namely, the Kalman filter algorithm based on a state space system. State 
space representation is usually applied in dynamic time series models that involve unobserved 
variables (e.g., Engle and Watson, 1981; Hamilton, 1994; Kim and Nelson, 1989). A typical state 
space model consists of two equations. One is a state equation that describes the dynamics of the 
unobserved variables, and the other one is a measurement equation that describes the relation 
between the measured variables and the unobserved state variables,  
 
 
1 ,
~ 0,
t t t
t
X C FX
Q
  
 
 (11) 
where 1,
2,
t
t
t
X
X
X
 
  
 
,
 1
0
k te
C
   
  
  
,
0
0 1
k te
F
  
  
 
,
1,
2,
t
t
t


 
   
 
 and 
2
1 1 2 12
2
2 1 21 2
Q t
   
   
 
  
 
.  
Rewritten in compact form, this expression reduces further to give 
 t tY HX  (12) 
where tY  is the term premium series and  1 1H   represents the weights of the two 
components in the term premium. 
3.2 Markov-Switching Disturbances 
An additional feature of our model is that it allows each component’s disturbance term to depend 
on different states of the economy. In practice, we let the volatilities of the disturbance terms 
switch between high- and low-volatility regimes. Formally, we assume that 2
1  and 
2
2  in 
Eq. (13) are driven by two discrete-valued, independent unobserved first-order Markov chain 
processes  1, 0,1tS   and  2, 0,1tS   given by 
 
 
 
2 2 2 2 2
1 1, 1 1, 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2, 2 2, 2 2 2
1  , 
1  , 
t H t L H L
t H t L H L
S S
S S
    
    
   
   
 (14) 
When both 
1,tS  and 2,tS  are zero, the two components will be in the high-volatility state, as 
2 2
1 1H   and 
2 2
2 2H  ; similarly, if both 1,tS  and 2,tS  equal 1, the two components will be in the 
low-volatility state, since 2 2
1 1L   and 
2 2
2 2L  .  
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However, it is also possible for one component to be in the high-volatility state while the other is 
in the low-volatility state. The likelihood of the process remaining at the previous value or 
changing to the alternative depends on the probabilities of transition from one state to the other, 
which are shown below as 
 
1,00 1, 1, 1
1,11 1, 1, 1
2,00 2, 2, 1
2,11 2, 2, 1
Pr 0 | 0
Pr 1| 1
Pr 0 | 0
Pr 1| 1
t t
t t
t t
t t
p S S
p S S
p S S
p S S




    
    
    
    
 (15) 
To estimate the transition probabilities as shown above, we need to choose the appropriate 
functional forms of the probability functions that govern the Markov chain variables. Since the 
transition probabilities have to be bounded within  0,1  the usual choice is to adopt the logistic 
transformation on the probability terms as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,0
1,00 1, 1, 1 1,01 1,00
1,0
1,1
1,11 1, 1, 1 1,10 1,11
1,1
2,0
2,00 2, 2, 1 2,01 2,00
2,0
2,11 2, 2, 1
exp
Pr 0 | 0 , 1
1 exp
exp
Pr 1| 1 , 1
1 exp
exp
Pr 0 | 0 , 1
1 exp
Pr 1| 1
t t
t t
t t
t t
d
p S S p p
d
d
p S S p p
d
d
p S S p p
d
p S S




        
        
        
   
 
 
2,1
2,10 2,11
2,1
exp
, 1
1 exp
d
p p
d
   
 (16) 
where 
1,0d , 1,1d , 2,0d , and 2,1d  are the unconstrained parameters. 
To estimate the state space Markov-switching model described previously, we use Kim’s filter 
(Kim, 1994), which is a numerical algorithm that combines the Kalman filter in estimating state 
space models and the Hamilton filter (Hamilton, 1989) in estimating Markov-switching models. 
Specifically, we use the estimation procedures developed in Calice et al. (2012).  
3.3 VAR Analysis 
Once we decompose the CDS term premia into the unobserved STAT and RW components, we 
can test for the impact of observed economic and financial variables on these components within a 
VAR setting. In particular, we assume that this propagation can be nonlinear depending on the 
volatility regime of each component. Therefore, central to our analysis is (i) whether the observed 
economic and financial variables have a different impact on STAT and RW and (ii) whether the 
impacts on STAT and RW differ in the low- and high-volatility regime. Therefore, we run (for 
each unobserved component of the CDS term premium STAT and RW) a standard VAR on 
subsamples defined by transition probabilities estimated as described above. Specifically, we use 
the probability of being in the high-volatility regime with a cutting value of 0.5, i.e., at lower 
probability values the component is in the low-volatility regime, and otherwise it is in the high-
12 
 
volatility regime. Therefore, we keep observations from the high- and low-volatility regimes 
apart.12 The resulting four VAR(p) models can be written as follows: 
  
0
0,5
p
t i t i STATt tt
Y c Y I p      (17) 
  
0
0,5
p
t i t i STATt tt
Y c Y I p      (18) 
  
0
0,5
p
t i t i RWt tt
Y c Y I p      (19) 
  
0
0,5
p
t i t i RWt tt
Y c Y I p      (20) 
where tY  is the vector of p endogenous variables including the stationary component (STAT) or 
the random walk (RW) component as well as six financial variables (defined below) observed at 
daily frequency. I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when the estimated transition 
probability of being in the high-volatility regime ts  exceeds 0.5, and 0 otherwise. As we impose 
two independent first-order Markov chain processes, we attempt to capture the differential effect 
of each volatility regime on each subcomponent. Thus, we compute the generalized impulse 
response functions that are invariant to any ordering specification to trace out the responsiveness 
of the dependent variables (STAT or RW) to one unit generalized shock to each of the variables.  
It will be noted that the first step (the decomposition of the CDS premium into the two 
components and the estimation of the volatility regime for each of them) is subject to uncertainty, 
which also conditions the results obtained in the second step (VAR analysis). Unfortunately, as 
joint estimation in one step is empirically unfeasible, the uncertainty cannot be completely 
avoided. Still, we assume that this uncertainty does not significantly affect our results. In addition, 
we take a number of steps to reduce it. First, while the two estimated components are unobserved 
variables, they are (by construction) normally distributed and, therefore, the means of the impulse 
responses produced by the VAR are not affected. Besides the VAR analysis based on the STAT 
and RW subcomponents, we also consider as a robustness check the whole CDS term premium 
(without decomposition). Second, the estimation error of the unobserved component model is 
expected to be heteroskedastic, as more volatile periods are subject to higher uncertainty. That is 
why we explicitly allow for endogenous regime switches in volatility by adding Markov-
switching disturbance terms into the two unobserved components. Consequently, in the VAR 
model we allow for subsample analysis keeping the observations from low- and high-volatility 
periods apart. However, there is also uncertainty associated with the very estimates of the 
switching probabilities. Therefore, we adopt a simplification consisting in using moving averages 
of the estimated switching probabilities, which avoids using the exact value estimated for each 
point in time and instead relies on their smoothed average on a window of one month. By doing 
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We believe that our two-step approach consisting in (i) univariate series decomposition and regime 
identification and (ii) subsample analysis with standard linear VAR has some clear advantages over the use of 
more complicated VAR models such as threshold or Markov-switching VARs. Notably, it is very difficult to 
make inference on either, as a shock to an endogenous variable can imply a change of regime, which complicates 
the construction of the impulse response functions, as these depend on the sign and size of the shock. Threshold 
VAR additionally requires prior identification of the endogenous threshold variable, i.e., an assumption of what 
the threshold variable is. We do not possess such prior knowledge and simply assume that the regimes can be 
derived from the CDS term premium or its components. Moreover, we do not assume there are regimes that 
differ from those identified in the first step of the estimation procedure. 
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so, we also eliminate some erratic developments that would imply implausibly frequent regime 
switches. Finally, we perform a robustness check with alternative values of the switching 
probability to split the sample into low- and high-volatility regimes.13 
4. Empirical Results 
Using the methodology described in Section 3, we estimate for each country a series of nested 
Markov-switching unobserved component models. Furthermore, we run a battery of tests on the 
model specification to determine the preferred model to use in the empirical analysis.  
4.1 Model Selection Tests 
It is well known that for Markov-switching models the standard likelihood ratio test of the null 
hypothesis of linearity does not have the usual 
2  distribution. The reason is that there are 
nuisance parameters which cannot be identified under the null hypothesis. As a result, the scores 
evaluated at the null hypothesis are identically zero.14 We use the Hansen (1992) procedure, 
which provides an upper bound on the valuep  for linearity, to determine the significance of the 
improvement for allowing Markov-switching disturbance terms in the two components. In 
addition, we consider more conventional ways of selecting models based on the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Finally, we 
verify our model selection results by running a series of residual diagnostic tests to establish 
whether the selected model is able to infer serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the data 
series. 
To implement the Hansen (1992) procedure, we need to evaluate the constrained likelihood under 
the null hypothesis over a grid of values for the nuisance parameters. Defining the restricted 
model under the null hypothesis of no regime switching of the two components’ disturbance terms 
as described in Eq. (12) with 12 21 0   , and the alternative model under the assumption of 
Markov-switching disturbance terms (as shown in Eq. 16–18), the nuisance parameters are 
denoted as  1 2 1,00 1,11 2,00 2,11, , , , ,H H p p p p  .  
Further, we test whether a model allowing correlated disturbance terms performs better than a 
model with restrictions to zero correlations. The results suggest that the models with correlated 
disturbance terms generally produce higher likelihood values and lower AIC and BIC statistics. 
We verify this result with the residual diagnostic tests, where we test the overall randomness of 
the residuals of the models (the summation of the disturbance terms of the two components) with 
the null hypothesis of assuming randomness. It is important to stress that although the most 
flexible model is not a powerful autocorrelation measure in the residuals (like all the other 
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 Threshold VAR (e.g., Balke, 2000) allows estimation of the unknown threshold (for a selected threshold 
variable, which in our case is the estimated probability of the high-volatility regime) as well as inference of its 
relevance, rather than assuming that the threshold is equal to a certain value (in our case 0.5). However, our use 
of the moving average of the estimated probabilities makes the identification of the regime “rougher,” which in 
our view avoids the need for a very precise threshold estimation method. 
14
 Hansen (1992) and Garcia (1998) introduce alternative tests of linearity against regime switching. 
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alternative models) it nonetheless does a relatively good job in capturing the ARCH effects in the 
residuals.15 
4.2 Estimation of the Markov-Switching Unobserved Component Model 
Table 1 reports the maximum likelihood estimates from the most flexible and best performing 
model for the five countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the Czech Republic, and Poland). As is 
evident, there is a significant regime-dependent long-term equilibrium of the stationary 
component for Spain, Portugal, Poland, and Ireland, but not for the Czech Republic. The two 
regimes, which are defined in our model as low- and high-volatility regimes of the term premium 
series, are strongly associated, respectively, with a positive and negative long-term equilibrium 
level of the stationary component for all countries with the exception of Poland. 
In normal market conditions, the CDS term premium is generally upward sloping, which suggests 
that the market is not factoring in imminent default risks but expectations about protection costs 
are increasing with the tenor of the CDS contract. On the contrary, the term premium could turn 
negative if market conditions worsened in the immediate future. Since a negative long-term 
equilibrium level of the term premium is in general interpreted as the result of a short-term 
deterioration in credit markets, the coincidence of this with high-volatility regimes of the term 
premium is not a surprise. In other words, a worsening of credit market conditions brings about a 
surge in volatility as well as an automatic correction of the term premium to its long-term 
equilibrium. 
Table 1: Estimation Results 
 
Parameters Spain Portugal Ireland Czech 
Republic 
Poland 
L  
0.0485 
(3.1056E-05) 
0.0197 
(1.0804E-05) 
-0.0475 
(1.4887E-05) 
  0.0225 
(5.8769E-05) 
0.1433 
(0.0312) 
H  
-0.0190 
(2.1885E-05) 
-3.0668 
(1.2516E-04) 
-1.4020 
(0.2443) 
-0.0105 
(0.1668) 
0.3477 
(0.0227) 
Lk  
22.4741 
(0.0012) 
66.2939 
(0.0014) 
126.4403 
(8.5057E-03) 
0.1425 
(1.5520E-03) 
0.4226 
(0.1297) 
Hk  
0.6438 
(4.9187E-05) 
0.6822 
(1.9017E-04) 
0.4118 
(0.0324) 
0.0783 
(0.7619) 
0.3477 
(0.0227) 
1,L  
0.0320 
(1.0230E-05) 
0.2502 
(1.7560E-05) 
0.0378 
(1.7379E-05) 
0.0763 
(8.5528E-07) 
0.0010 
(2.0738E-03) 
1,H  
0.5147 
(1.9946E-05) 
1.6820 
(9.9406E-05) 
0.5189 
(0.0002) 
0.4892 
(2.2147E-05) 
0.0109 
(0.0522) 
2,L  
0.0315 
(1.2994E-05) 
0.0221 
(7.6557E-06) 
0.0711 
(1.1732E-05) 
0.1033 
(1.3741E-07) 
0.2457 
(3.8638E-03) 
2,H  
0.5534 
(6.8113E-05) 
3.2845 
(3.5630E-06) 
0.7310 
(6.7586E-06) 
0.7047 
(2.6688E-06) 
0.8019 
(0.0100) 
1 ,2L L  
0.6073 
(3.2774E-04) 
0.6317 
(9.2002E-04) 
0.6300 
(4.8726E-04) 
-0.0839 
(1.4499E-03) 
-0.8520 
(1.6914) 
1 ,2H L  
0.8248 
(4.0280E-04) 
0.8010 
(5.0474E-05) 
0.7360 
(0.3688) 
0.1917 
(4.0405E-04) 
-0.8043 
(1.2358) 
1 ,2L H  
0.7743 
(8.3614E-05) 
0.8228 
(6.6015E-04) 
-0.7710 
(0.5146) 
0.9897 
(0.3076) 
-0.9964 
(0.2025) 
1 ,2H H  
0.7472 
(1.6348E-04) 
0.7882 
(1.0329E-04) 
-0.8316 
(2.1876E-04) 
-0.3593 
(9.6442E-04) 
0.8811 
(0.4177) 
1,LLp  1,00p  
0.9863 
(9.0534E-07) 
0.9712 
(1.8354E-06) 
0.9430 
(4.8348E-06) 
0.9626 
(1.0508E-06) 
0.9682 
(1.7403E-03) 
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 Detailed results can be found in the appendix of the working paper version of this paper (Calice et al., 2014). 
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1,HHp  1,11p  
0.9831 
(4.1444E-06) 
0.9847 
(1.8719E-05) 
0.9735 
(1.3860E-05) 
0.9898 
(2.8870E-06) 
0.9926 
(0.0014) 
2,LLp  2,00p  
0.9827 
(1.1462E-06) 
0.9894 
(1.6175E-06) 
0.9506 
(4.2208E-06) 
0.9974 
(5.8977E-08) 
0.9957 
(7.7948E-04) 
2,HHp  2,11p  
0.9879 
(8.0015E-07) 
0.9831 
(2.8821E-06) 
0.9531 
(4.6609E-06) 
0.9719 
(1.0084E-06) 
0.9707 
(0.0018) 
ln L  3964.227 2888.165 1687.581 3866.381 3496.308 
 
Note: The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2 provides the decomposition of the CDS term premium into the STAT and RW 
components (upper panels) as well as the estimated probabilities of each component switching to 
the high-volatility regime (lower panels). First of all, we note that the two components show 
rather dissimilar behavior and most of the spikes in the term premium are driven by the RW 
component and can be interpreted as departure from the mean-reverting behavior of the STAT 
component, whereas the mean reversion is the expected behavior of the whole CDS term 
premium/spread. Therefore, we interpret the STAT component as the fundamental part of the 
CDS term premium, whereas the RW component is the random part whose nonstationarity is 
driven by shocks. 
Following this logic, the most interesting periods are those when the STAT component turns 
negative, i.e., when the financial markets expect an immediate possibility of sovereign default and 
this cannot be interpreted as random behavior. This happens for Spain, Portugal, and Ireland 
following the markets’ reactions to the European sovereign debt crisis, when banks’ asset write-
downs and diminishing liquidity in funding markets raised the degree of uncertainty about future 
credit events. For Spain, worries about the government’s ability to repay its debt, as well as the 
negative state of the economy,16 further intensified the strains in financial markets. For Portugal, 
the cut of its sovereign bond rating by Moody’s by two notches seems to be the key determinant 
of the steady decline of its term premium in the latter part of the sample period, with STAT 
reverting to negative territory in summer 2011, when the crisis intensified. As in the case of 
Portugal, the market’s concerns over Ireland’s debt spiral intensified when Moody’s downgraded 
Irish sovereign bonds to junk status, which drove STAT to negative territory in very early 2011. 
Whereas the STAT of these countries returned to zero afterwards, the CDS term premia remained 
in negative territory due to a very negative RW component. Indeed, the volatile RW component is 
the main driver of the significant departures of the term premium into negative values and thus its 
overall nonstationarity.  
The Central European countries exhibit different decomposition results from Ireland and Portugal. 
The term premium series for these two countries is positive for most of the sample period, with 
the notable exception of 2008. For most of the 2009–2010 period, both the RW and stationary 
components for the Czech and Polish term premia experience a relatively “mild” regime. This 
could possibly be explained by improving conditions in credit markets and a better outlook for the 
CE region. Although both countries’ banks belong to global financial groups that have been 
severely hit by the “credit crunch,” their activities are mainly inward oriented. The tendency to 
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 As Spain is one of the largest eurozone economies (larger than Greece, Portugal, and Ireland combined) the 
condition of its economy is of particular concern to international observers. Under pressure from the United 
States, the IMF, other European countries, and the European Commission, the Spanish government eventually 
succeeded in trimming the deficit from 11.2% of GDP in 2009 to an expected 5.4% in 2012. 
16 
 
generate profits mainly through dynamically expanding retail banking activities has ensured a 
high level of balance sheet liquidity for Czech and Polish banks and has avoided a strong 
dependence on funds from foreign markets, unlike in Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. 
The estimation results also reveal that for all these countries the mean reversion speed has an 
inverse relationship with the volatilities, i.e., a high speed of mean reversion materializes when 
the term premium is in a relative stationary state, whilst it takes longer for the term premium to 
revert to its long-term mean when the market enters the high-volatility regime. During non-crisis 
periods, asset prices are less likely to stay high or low period-to-period, but mean revert quickly to 
their long-term equilibrium values. In other words, mean-reverting asset prices imply a low 
probability of ending up in the tail of the distribution.17 Portugal and Ireland show similar inverse 
relationships between the mean-reverting speed parameter and the volatility regimes.18 
As for the Czech Republic and Poland, the rising profile of the term premium generates 
considerable volatilities in the market. The transition probabilities, plotted in Figure 4, clearly 
show that the term premium enters the high-volatility regime in early 2011 for both countries.19 
Although the Czech Republic and Poland have more favorable credit market conditions than 
Portugal and Ireland, the spikes in the transition probabilities of both components switching to the 
high-volatility regime after mid-2011 may be an indication of potential spillover effects, as 
volatility shocks quickly transmitted to the Central European countries’ capital markets. 
Given the lead of the RW component, especially in its high-volatility regime, it seems interesting 
to test whether their movements are merely random or whether they can be attributed to some 
other observable market developments. This is the subject of the following analysis, which looks 
at the potential determinants of each component in each regime separately. 
                                                          
17
 Our estimate of the Spanish mean-reverting speed ( k ) is 22.4741 in the low-volatility regime, which 
translates into a first-order autocorrelation of -0.9140. The speed in the high-volatility regime, on the other hand, 
falls to 0.6438 or -0.9974 in terms of first-order autocorrelation, revealing very persistent behavior of the 
stationary component in the high-volatility regime but less persistent behavior in the low-volatility regime. 
18
 Our estimate of the mean-reverting speed is 66.2939 (126.4403) in the low-volatility regime, which translates 
into a first-order autocorrelation of -0.7671 (-0.6030) for Portugal (Ireland). The speed in the high-volatility 
regime, on the other hand, falls to 0.6822 (0.4118) or -0.9972 (-0.9983) in terms of first-order autocorrelation, 
which suggests very persistent behavior of the stationary component in the high-volatility regime. 
19
 Particularly for Poland, the estimate of the high-volatility regime long-term equilibrium (0.3477) is much 
higher than the low-volatility regime one (0.1433). 
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Figure 2: CDS Term Premium Decomposition (Upper Panel) and Probabilities of Switching to High-Volatility Regime (Lower Panel) 
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Note: RW is the nonstationary unobserved component of the CDS term premium, STAT is the stationary component of the CDS term premium, p_rw11 is the filtered 
probability of the high-volatility regime for the RW component, p_stat11 is the filtered probability of the high-volatility regime for the STAT component, 
p_rw11_ma is the moving average of p_rw11, and p_stat11_ma is the moving average of p_stat11. 
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4.3 Determinants of the CDS Term Premium – Regime-Dependent VAR Analysis 
To shed some light on the relative contribution of the key determinants of the sovereign CDS term 
premium, we perform a regime-dependent VAR analysis of the CDS term premium 
subcomponents. Therefore, we try to establish a link between the unobserved components STAT 
and RW and the observed market variables. Since here we adopt a two-step estimation procedure, 
it is again worth acknowledging that some degrees of estimation uncertainty would inevitably be 
carried over to the second step of the estimation of the VAR model.20 Indeed, STAT and RW are 
unobserved variables that are subject to estimation error. As the uncertainty associated with either 
unobserved component may be varying in time (specifically higher in the high-volatility regime 
and lower in the low-volatility one) independent estimation of the observations in different 
regimes allows us to circumvent possible heteroskedasticity bias problems. 
Four VARs are run for each country, dividing the sample according to the volatility regime of 
STAT and RW. We use moving averages of the filtered probabilities (see Figure 2) in order to 
have regimes of a reasonable length. The smoothing of probabilities is also useful to avoid 
uncertainty of regimes, i.e., a smoothed average on a window of one month is used instead of the 
exact value of the filtered probability for each point in time. 
Overall, it appears that there is relevant heterogeneity of the IRFs across the CDS term 
subcomponents STAT and RW and their volatility regimes. Either the responses of the overall 
CDS term premium21 are driven by the responses of one subcomponent and/or one volatility 
regime, or, when the IRFs of the overall CDS term premium are rather muted, we find much 
sharper IRFs when looking at its STAT and RW subcomponents in regime-dependent fashion. As 
expected, the responses are more significant for the RW component, in particular in its high-
volatility regime. Remarkably, even where there is a response in both volatility regimes, the 
magnitude of the RW response in the high-volatility regime is sometimes as much as ten times 
higher than in the low-volatility regime, even when the shocks are of similar magnitude.22 
All these features become apparent in Figure 3, where we draw the IRFs for each subcomponent 
in each regime for one sample country – Spain. The IRFs correspond to shocks to two variables: 
(i) the sovereign bond yield slope and (ii) stock returns. The standard deviations of the two 
variables are very similar in both volatility regimes (of the CDS term premium subcomponents), 
so the magnitudes of the IRFs can be compared across regimes. While a shock to the slope of the 
Spanish bond yield curve only affects the RW component (left column) and not the STAT 
                                                          
20
 Alternatively, a macro-finance setting, such as the model of Ang and Piazzesi (2003), could substantially 
reduce the estimation errors. However, the restrictive formulation of the observed variables in a typical macro-
finance setting could overshadow the economically meaningful interpretation of the interactive market variables. 
Our goal, in this paper, is to test for an economically meaningful relationship between the unobserved 
components and a set of observed information that is available to both market participants and policy makers. 
21
 These results can be found in the working paper version of this paper (Calice et al., 2014). 
22
 The magnitudes of the IRFs should not be automatically compared in the low- and high-volatility regimes 
given that the size of the shocks (the depicted shock corresponds to one standard deviation of each endogenous 
variable) might differ across these regimes. However, since we define the regimes in terms of the volatility of 
RW and STAT the variability of the other variables in the VAR might be independent of these regimes. Indeed, 
the standard deviations of the bond yield slope, short-term interest rate, stock returns, banking CDS term spread, 
and VIX are very similar in both volatility regimes. Therefore, one can reasonably compare the magnitude of the 
IRFs in each regime. In contrast, the standard deviations of CDS market liquidity vary substantially across these 
regimes, as this variable is more directly linked to the volatility regimes of the CDS term premium components. 
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component (right column), the magnitude of the RW response is ten times higher in the high-
volatility regime (upper row) than in the low-volatility regime (lower row). The evidence is 
similar for a shock to stock returns. The IRF responses in the high-volatility regime (upper row) 
are a multiple of those in the low-volatility regime (lower row). Moreover, we can now see that 
even the STAT component is affected. 
Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Response Functions of VAR Models for Spain 
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Note: RW in the high-volatility regime – upper left, RW in the low-volatility regime – lower left, STAT in 
the high-volatility regime – upper right, STAT in the low-volatility regime – lower right 
Given the more pronounced response of the RW subcomponent in the high-volatility regime for 
all the countries, we now focus our discussion on the empirics for the IRFs of the RW 
subcomponent in the high-volatility regime. Figure 4 illustrates the IRFs related to each financial 
variable. Note that although this component tracks the apparently random movements of the CDS 
term premium, these fluctuations are not completely random but can be attributed to identifiable 
financial shocks. A number of interesting findings emerge from this analysis. 
First, a shock to CDS market liquidity (first column) affects the CDS premium (in all cases, this 
refers to the RW subcomponent in the high-volatility regime) in all countries. The typical pattern 
for the three countries of the EMU periphery is that a positive shock to CDS market liquidity (i.e., 
an increase in the bid-ask spread and a decrease in liquidity) is accompanied by an immediate 
decrease of the CDS term premium, which moves back into positive territory the next day. On the 
contrary, for the Czech Republic and Poland the opposite pattern emerges. Whereas the expected 
sign of the effect of CDS market liquidity on the CDS term premium is ambiguous (see Calice et 
al., 2012), the finding confirms that microstructure effects unrelated to actual sovereign risk may 
affect this measure of perceived sovereign default risk. According to the FEVD, for Portugal and 
Ireland, for which this pattern of overshooting and correction is the most pronounced, CDS 
liquidity is the main driver of the entire CDS term premium. 
Second, the response to shocks to the slope of the sovereign bond yield curve (second column) is 
expected to be positive, as the sovereign CDS should reflect the development of the underlying 
sovereign bond market. While this pattern appears in all countries, we can observe positive IRFs 
only for Spain and Portugal. The lack of a robust response in either direction for the other 
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countries suggests that these two markets are probably disconnected. This might reflect the fact 
that the sovereign CDS market, as opposed to the bond market, is still substantially 
underdeveloped, thereby limiting the potential for arbitrage opportunities. 
Third, for most countries we do not detect a significant response to a short-term interest rate shock 
(third column). This suggests that (improved) liquidity conditions in the money market or 
monetary policy action are unable to directly affect (reduce) sovereign default risk. 
Fourth, the response to stock market returns (fourth column) is almost uniformly positive. This is 
consistent with the argument that an increase in stock returns is at any time a sign of optimism 
about a country’s economy, which in turn steepens the CDS term premium. However, the original 
positive response in the first period is subsequently corrected in the second period. This uncovers 
some overshooting that is subsequently immediately corrected. Interestingly, for RW the response 
in the high-volatility regime is much stronger than that in the low-volatility regime (not reported 
here), for example, ten times stronger in the case of Spain and five times stronger in the case of 
Ireland. This confirms the existence of a very strong link between the stock market and the 
sovereign debt market. 
Fifth, the response to a steepening of the banking CDS term spread is significant for Spain, 
Portugal, and Ireland (fifth column, not available for CE countries), although it is contradictorily 
negative for Ireland, suggesting that sovereign and banking default risk are substitutes rather than 
complements as commonly considered. This finding underscores the different nature of the 
problems in Ireland in comparison to Spain and Portugal. The sovereign debt crisis in Ireland 
originated primarily in structural weaknesses in the domestic banking sector. As a consequence of 
this, Irish policy makers had to deploy liquidity assistance measures for the banking sector. This 
effort strengthened the resilience of the Irish banking system (steepening the Irish banks’ CDS 
term premium) but obviously led to a severe deterioration in the financial position of the public 
sector (flattening the country’s CDS term premium). In contrast, the negative spiral of economic 
downturn, austerity measures, and further economic recession in Spain and Portugal spilled over 
to local financial institutions. As a result, banks and sovereign CDS premia have been tracking 
each other closely throughout the crisis. 
Sixth, international factors are represented by the EU CDS term premium (sixth column) and the 
U.S. VIX (seventh column). The EU CDS term premium, which is aimed at tracking international 
spillover on the sovereign CDS market, has a significant impact for only one country – Portugal. 
This lends support to our main argument that the CDS term premium can be considered a measure 
of idiosyncratic risk. By contrast, the response to the VIX is statistically significant for all the 
countries except Portugal. The immediate response is negative. Therefore, an increase in risk 
aversion significantly flattens the CDS term premium, i.e., widens the short-term credit risk 
premium by increasing the perceived probability of a financial crisis and of sovereign default. As 
in the case of stock prices, we observe a pattern of an overshooting reaction in the first period that 
in general is corrected the following day. For some countries, such as Spain and Ireland, we again 
find (as in the case of stock returns) a response several times higher during turbulent periods. This 
result parallels the findings of Alexander and Kaeck (2008), and is in line with the original model 
of Merton (1974), suggesting that higher volatility implies a higher probability of default, which 
in turn induces a substantial reduction in the CDS term premium. 
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Finally, we haveconducted two robustness checks with respect to the two-step estimation 
methodology. Specifically, we tested whether the uncertainty inherent in the first step affects the 
second step results. First, we removed the first step of our procedure completely and thus used the 
entire CDS term premium. In many instances the estimates obtained were similar to the results 
associated with the RW component. However, in some cases the IRFs were less significant, 
confirming that the decomposition and the state-dependent model allow us to reveal dynamic 
relations that could not be uncovered otherwise. Second, we allowed for alternative splits of the 
sample (into the low- and high-volatility regimes) using switching probability values of 0.4 and 
0.6 (instead of 0.5). It is important to point out that neither of these choices drastically altered the 
baseline results. 
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Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Response Functions for RW Subcomponent in High-Volatility Regime 
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5. Conclusions 
This study was designed to examine one specific measure of perceived sovereign risk: the CDS 
term premium. Following the logic of forward-rate derivation from the term structure, the CDS 
term premium can be seen as the market’s evaluation of the probability that immediate financial 
turmoil will hit a country. We focus on a selected group of EU sovereigns over the financial crisis 
period, when the use of sovereign CDS contracts dramatically increased. The CDS term premia of 
these sovereigns (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the Czech Republic, and Poland) recorded substantial 
swings between positive and negative territory and also featured nonstationary and regime-
dependent behavior. We estimate a Markov-switching unobserved component model to 
decompose the CDS term premium of each sovereign into two unobservable components which 
are of different statistical nature and as such can be affected by different shocks. Specifically, we 
are interested in filtering out the stationary part to understand the drivers of the nonstationarity, 
allowing for two structurally different periods (high versus low volatility). 
Our paper is mainly related to the empirical literature on sovereign credit risk, which is proxied by 
sovereign CDS spreads. Our work has a resemblance to Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff 
et al. (2011), who attempt to estimate default risk using the entire credit curve of sovereign CDS 
premia. However, our paper differs from theirs in several important respects. First, we 
complement and extend these studies by conducting our analysis at the level of individual term 
premium rather than at a spread level. Second, we use a framework that allows us to distinguish 
between the nonstationary and stationary components of the sovereign CDS term premium and 
their associated volatility regimes. Third, we explore the links between the two components of the 
sovereign CDS term premium and a set of both local and global financial variables in each 
volatility regime separately. The main advantage of this procedure is that it allows us to identify 
the idiosyncratic constituent and its high-frequency drivers rather than common factors or 
measures of contagion. Therefore, our focus is on the time rather than the cross-country 
dimension. 
We show that the decomposition of the CDS premium is statistically and economically important. 
Major changes in the CDS term premium are driven mainly by spikes in its nonstationary 
component. Indeed, we find that the sovereign CDS term premium is significantly affected 
through the nonstationary component by a number of financial market variables in a nonlinear, 
regime-dependent fashion. The magnitude of the response seems to indicate that in periods of 
elevated volatility the perception of sovereign risk can be intensified by shocks in other markets, 
even those that are not directly exposed to sovereign risk. The impact of financial market 
variables on the sovereign CDS term premium is normally short-lived, as it fully materializes 
within one or two trading days on average. In some cases, there is evidence of market 
overshooting, i.e., the initial response is corrected by one of the opposite sign the next day. We 
also find that a common driver of the CDS term premium is domestic CDS market liquidity, 
which suggests that market microstructure matters in pricing sovereign default risk. By contrast, 
our results for some countries reveal that there is practically no mutual response between the 
sovereign CDS and the bond market when slope effects are taken into account. On the other hand, 
the generalized positive response of the CDS term premium to stock prices provides further 
evidence of persistent transmission of shocks across markets. Conversely, the response of the 
national CDS term premia to a pan-European risk factor is quite contained, demonstrating its 
relevance as an idiosyncratic measure of sovereign risk. 
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The short-term factors of the CDS term premium dynamics feature some cross-country 
differences. A notable one is the response to the money market interest rate, which tracks short-
term liquidity conditions, which can be affected by monetary policy actions. In particular, while 
the sovereign risk premium responds to the money market rate in the CE countries, which have 
maintained autonomous monetary policy, there is no response to money market rates in the three 
EMU periphery countries. In other words, it seems that the direct effect of the common monetary 
policy on the sovereign CDS term premium is limited and has to be “intermediated” by changes in 
the sovereign bond yield curves. In addition, and quite strikingly, our results show that the 
relationship between sovereign credit risk and global risk aversion is not significant for any of the 
CE countries, but is positively significant for all of the EMU periphery countries. More 
importantly, for the EMU sovereigns we also find evidence that an increase in risk aversion can 
have a more persistent effect on the perceived riskiness of these countries by affecting the 
stationary component of their CDS term premia. In countries such as Spain or Ireland, we also 
document a very strong link between sovereign and banking credit risk. 
Our analysis may provide monetary policy authorities with more detailed information on financial 
market perceptions of vulnerabilities present in sovereign credit markets as well as on the sources 
of propagation of those vulnerabilities. Our findings may also have important policy implications, 
especially given the recent events related to the eurozone sovereign crisis. Although they broadly 
confirm that the short-term dynamics of sovereign CDS are probably disconnected from economic 
fundamentals, given the nature of their determinants it is still unclear whether the new reform 
initiatives will be welfare enhancing. Most notably, the ban on the use of “naked” CDS contracts 
on European sovereign entities might reduce the liquidity of the sovereign CDS market through 
these microstructure effects and in turn change the perceived risk valuation of single sovereigns. 
While corporate – including banking – CDS are not included in this regulation, the evidence in 
this paper suggests that some of the most dramatic movements in sovereign risk were indeed 
driven by shocks originating in domestic banking sectors. 
This article is aimed to be a step toward the development of a full-fledged consistent framework 
to gain greater insight into the dynamics of the sovereign CDS curve across different parts of the 
credit cycle and into the relationship between the shape of the term structure and macro/financial 
variables. Interesting possibilities for further research include the consideration of an extended 
number of maturities and the nexus between fundamental, financial, and microstructure factors of 
sovereign risk premia. These extensions, along with a complementing examination of liquidity 
risks and the risk of spillovers, will enhance our understanding of the dynamics of sovereign risk 
from the systemic viewpoint. 
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